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In this dissertation, I draw upon the collapse of the Soviet
Union to shed light on the behavior of workers and the human
capital they embody. The questions I address in each of the
three essays have general economic importance and public
policy implications: What is the impact of grants on occupational choice and productivity? What is the relationship
between location and productivity? How do incentives in the
wage structure impact migration decisions? The changes that
accompanied the end of the USSR, the increased availability
of microlevel data in recent years in the form of publication
and census data, and quasi-experimental methods allow me to
provide new causal evidence on these topics.
The first two essays concern the behavior of scientists,
members of the labor force with high levels of human capital
and who play an important role in knowledge production
and economic growth. In the first essay, I ask how research
grants impact scientific output and scientists’ decisions in a
setting with a large scientific labor force but limited funding
opportunities. Using information from the earliest large-scale
grant program for Soviet scientists, I employ a regression
discontinuity design to obtain causal estimates of the impact
of grants. I construct a unique panel data set of scientists
and their publications and show that the grants more than
doubled researcher publications and induced scientists to
remain in the science sector.
In the second essay, I study the unprecedented exodus
westward of scientists after the end of the USSR and examine both the selection of emigrants and the impact of emigration on their subsequent productivity. Using a unique panel
data set of Russian scientists and a difference-in-differences
approach, I show that scientists who emigrated after the end
of the USSR were more productive after they left Russia
compared to scientists who did not emigrate. Exploiting the
increase in international collaboration among scientists who
did not emigrate, I also show that international collaboration
is associated with an increase in researcher productivity, but
less than for emigration.
In the third essay, I analyze immigrant selection before
and after the USSR within a Roy Model framework. With
microlevel data from Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria, along
with data for immigrants in the United States, Spain, and
Greece, I compare immigrants’ predicted wages in the source
country with the predicted wages of their native counterparts. I also reweight the source country wage distributions
by the characteristics of immigrants in host countries. These
approaches allow me to see what part of the source country
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distribution immigrants would fall in had they not emigrated.
I find evidence of positive selection for the United States,
and negative selection for Greece and Spain after the fall
of the Soviet Union. During communism, selection among
Soviet men in the United States was intermediate and selection among women was positive.
While a shock on the scale of the Soviet collapse is
unlikely to recur, the evidence I provide about the behavior of workers from the Soviet experience can help inform
policymakers in the areas of labor, science, and immigration
policy. As in most crisis situations, the end of the Soviet
Union was unexpected. Recent experiences regarding the
magnitude and unexpectedness of the financial crisis and
natural disasters show the fragility of government resources
and institutions. The evidence in this dissertation suggests
that after sharp economic changes, workers make important
occupation and location decisions. Targeted policies can
impact the size and productivity of the labor force during
these times of transition, which can have lasting impacts on
innovation, economic growth, and well-being.

Chapter 1
Saving Soviet Science: The Impact of Grants
When Government R&D Funding Disappears
Governments fund science in order to support the production of basic scientific knowledge, a key input for innovation, and ultimately, economic growth (Brooks 1994; Romer
1990). How can policymakers most effectively support
scientists in the advancement of scientific knowledge? The
answer to this question is still not well understood, especially
considering the extent of government resources devoted to
this pursuit. Existing research has almost exclusively focused
on developed country settings, where levels of government
R&D funding are high and financing opportunities abound.
Therefore, estimates of the impact of any specific R&D funding program are typically underwhelming due to the wide
availability of alternate funding opportunities (e.g., Jacob
and Lefgren 2007) or a potentially inelastic supply of scientists (Goolsbee 1998).
In this essay, I estimate the impact of one type of R&D
funding—research grants for basic scientists—on scientific
output and scientists’ decisions in a setting with very limited
public sector funding for science. Drawing upon the earliest
large-scale “emergency” grant program for Soviet scientists,
funded by financier George Soros under the auspices of
the International Science Foundation (ISF), I estimate the
impact of grants when there is a large scientific labor force
but limited funding opportunities for scientists. This “experiment,” the dramatic drop in government R&D funding, and
the ISF grant program provide an opportunity to estimate the
marginal impact of funding for science when there are few
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funding opportunities and the supply of scientists is presumably very elastic.
The ISF grant program had two components: an individual and a team-based grant. The first component was an
individual cash grant of $500, which represented approximately one year’s salary at the time, and was awarded to
over 26,000 basic scientists actively publishing in top Soviet/
Russian and international journals. The second component
was aimed at supporting the research team of the top scientists. An additional $1,000 was given to the “best” scientists
among all those who received the individual cash grant,
which they were to divide among members of their research
team.
There are still few studies providing evidence on the
causal impact of grants on scientific output due to the associated empirical challenges. Because grant receipt is likely
to be correlated with ability or other unobserved factors,
simple estimates of the impact of grant receipt would tend
to be biased upward due to selection issues (see Jaffe [2002]
for a discussion). Grants are rarely randomly assigned, and
instead are usually awarded after extensive review processes,
the deliberations of which are often confidential. Apart from
Jacob and Lefgren (2007), who exploit discontinuities in
National Institute of Health priority scores and grant receipt,
few studies have been able to examine grant programs that
provide conditions in which to avoid selection problems.
In this case, I was able to employ quasi-experimental
methods to obtain causal estimates of the impact of the
grants. The ISF grants were called “emergency” grants
because Soros desired that the funds be dispersed to scientists as quickly as possible considering the dire situation.
Therefore, simple eligibility criteria had to be used: to
receive the grant, an individual had to have at least three
publications between 1988 and the time of the grant program
announcement in 1993. Moreover, the recipients of the team
grant would be the scientists who had the highest impact
factor scores among all those who applied, based on each
scientist’s top three publications, so no additional application
process was used.
The suddenness of the program and the simple, nonlinear
structure of the eligibility rules allow me to avoid typical
selection issues and utilize exogenous variation in grant
receipt. I estimate the causal impact of the grants by comparing scientists who just missed the eligibility cutoffs with
those who just made them using regression discontinuity and
difference-in-differences approaches. The reasoning is that
scientists who just missed the cutoffs are a good counterfactual group for those who just made the cutoff—they are
likely to be very similar in observable and unobservable
ways, and only differ in their receipt of the grant.
Theoretical work in this area suggests that differing incentive schemes can play a role in the production of scientific
knowledge, and thus the structure of grants and the incentives they provide likely matter for scientists’ outcomes (e.g.,
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Manso 2009). The two types of grants in this case provide
an opportunity to estimate the impact of funding when it is
awarded to an individual scientist, and in line with the recent
evidence on the increasing importance of collaboration and
teams in scientific research, when it is awarded to a scientist’s research team (e.g., Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang 2010;
Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi 2007).1
Scientific grants can have an impact on both the extensive
margin (size of the science sector) and the intensive margin
(output of researchers in the science sector). Both margins
are likely to be salient in the post-Soviet setting. A key concern during this time was that scientists would exit the science sector because salaries had dropped too low and there
were alternative career options in the private sector. Another
concern was “brain drain”—that scientists would emigrate to
western countries, or might be recruited by rogue nations or
terrorist organizations for their knowledge related to weapons. Thus, in addition to the intensive margin, I examine the
impact of grants on the extensive margin and on emigration
rates.
The expected impact of the grants on these outcomes is
not clear-cut from a theoretical standpoint. First, it is not
clear how a one-time pecuniary shock would affect participation in the science sector or productivity, especially considering that challenges in enforcement may have essentially
made the individual grant “no strings-attached.” Second, the
expected impact on migration rates is ambiguous. The individual grant may have decreased migration costs by reducing
credit constraints, thereby increasing migration probabilities;
or it may have provided temporary means of subsistence to
scientists that deterred migration in the short run. I provide
a conceptual framework in which to think about the possible impacts the grants may have had on outcomes based on
models of occupational choice and the migration decision. I
also consider the role of incentives embedded in the structure of the two types of grants: the team grant, which would
be expected to facilitate research but not migration; and the
individual grant, which could do either.
To test these hypotheses, I create a panel data set of
grantees and nongrantees and match them to their publications and locations using the Thomson Reuters ISI Web of
Science database.2 My analysis provides evidence that both
grants had a positive impact on researcher publications.
The individual cash grant prevented scientists from exiting
science, particularly in the poorer, non-Moscow areas, and
doubled researcher publications on the margin. With higher
wages, more outside career options, and alternative funding
options in Moscow, this suggests that the individual grant
had more “bite” outside of Moscow, which is consistent with
theoretical predictions. The individual grant appears to have
prevented emigration among scientists, but only in Moscow,
where the costs of migration were lower. The increase in
publications attributed to the individual grant suggests that
Soros and the ISF spent about $100 per publication. The
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team grant also increased the team leader’s publications on
the margin, suggesting that there are complementaries in the
team production of research. The team grant, meanwhile,
seems to have facilitated migration, likely by sustaining
researcher productivity in the short run that kept the door
open for subsequent emigration possibilities.

Chapter 2
Location and Scientific Productivity: Evidence
from the Soviet “Brain Drain”
Policymakers in both the developed and developing world
are concerned about the location decisions of the world’s
scientists and engineers and how these decisions impact their
productivity. While many scientists and engineers today are
born or trained in the developing world, few stay there. In
fact, many of the top, “highly cited” scientists in the world
were born in developing countries, but very few remain there
to do their research (Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton 2009;
Weinberg 2010). Given the important role of scientists in
knowledge production and economic growth (Romer 1990),
countries that produce scientists but have their “brains
drained” are concerned about stemming this outflow, while
countries like the United States are benefitting from this
increasing “globalization” of science.3
While simple comparisons of the research output of
scientists in the developing and developed world suggest
large disadvantages to being located in a low-income country (see Kahn and MacGarvie [2008]), the factors driving
these differentials are not obvious. It is likely that there are
observed or unobserved differences between the individuals who choose to emigrate and those who do not in terms
of their preferences or their ability, which may be correlated
with research productivity. Therefore, without accounting for
these differences, estimates of the impact of being located
in a developed country would be biased upward. Recent
research on the mobility of scientists between countries has
focused on understanding which scientists emigrate, i.e., the
measurable selection of scientists, and has made steps toward
understanding the causal impact of emigrating on the productivity of the individual and their peers. This evidence suggests that scientists doing research in developing countries
appear to be at a disadvantage when compared to otherwise
similar scientists located in developed countries (Kahn and
MacGarvie 2008).
The productivity differentials between the developed and
developing world may be driven by a number of factors,
which can be considered inputs in the researcher production
function, such as differences in research funding and infrastructure, or knowledge inputs that depend on the peer group.
That is, in addition to more tangible differences, there may
be barriers to knowledge transfer in developing countries due
to the geographic distance from other scientists in the field
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(peers), which implies fewer knowledge spillovers (Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993), or from other nonphysical barriers to accessing knowledge (Agrawal, Kapur, and
McHale 2008). Other factors tied to a location, such as the
location of journal editorial boards or the culture surrounding
publication, can also matter for productivity.
To address concerns about endogeneity, previous studies
have attempted to use individual fixed effects models that
account for unobserved factors that may be correlated with
research productivity, or instrumental variables approaches
that provide exogenous variation in the location decisions
of scientists. However, the data requirements of these
approaches are significant. Because of the difficulty in tracking the location of scientists, much of the existing research
on the mobility and selection of scientists has used samples
of several hundred scientists who have moved between
countries, or are comprised of individuals in one field of science. The empirical challenge is that it is typically difficult to
observe scientists’ outcomes before and after they make the
decision to emigrate, and to find comparable control scientists who did not emigrate.
In this essay, I draw upon the unprecedented exodus westward of highly skilled scientists after the end of the USSR
to examine both the selection of emigrants and to estimate
the impact of emigration on their subsequent productivity.
The USSR was a country that had a large scientific community but was relatively “closed” to contact with researchers
outside of the Eastern bloc. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there were almost suddenly opportunities to meet
western scientists, to travel, and to emigrate. Many scientists
chose to move abroad to the United States, Israel, or Europe
to continue their careers, and opportunities for collaboration between former Soviet and western scientists increased
greatly. Anecdotes about the large “brain drain” abound, or
the darker allusions to the recruitment of scientists by rogue
nations for weapon building.
For my analysis, I create a large unique panel data set of
over 15,000 Russian scientists across many fields of science
who were publishing in the top Soviet journals just before
the end of the USSR. I match them to their publications and
affiliations using the Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Science
before and after the fall of the USSR. The panel nature of
the data allows me to observe the productivity of the top
scientists both during Soviet times and after the Soviet collapse, when there was increased mobility. In terms of selection, I show that on a number of observable characteristics,
emigrants look very different from those who stay at home.
The emigrants tend to be selected from the upper part of the
productivity distribution, and tend to be younger.
Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I then show
that scientists who emigrated were more productive after
they left Russia compared to scientists who did not emigrate.
However, I find heterogeneity in this effect. All else equal,
the most productive scientists during the 10 years before
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the end of the USSR who later emigrated were no more
productive after leaving Russia. I also find that the effect
of emigrating is lower if a scientist was from Moscow. For
robustness, I also use matching methods to compare individuals who emigrated to those who look similar on their
observable characteristics but did not emigrate, as well as an
instrumental variables approach using distance to Moscow as
an instrument for the decision to emigrate.
The end of the USSR and the “opening” of its borders
not only gave scientists greater freedom of mobility, but also
allowed them greater opportunity to interact with foreign
scientists. This increase in access to scientific communities
abroad after the end of the USSR reflects an aspect of the
globalization of science that continues to be salient. The relatively recent advances in communication through the Internet
and greater ease of travel are allowing scientists better access
to knowledge and increased communication/collaboration
with scientists abroad from distant locations. This “openness” should improve knowledge transfer by increasing nongeographic proximity to knowledge and thus reducing the
productivity differentials between scientists in the developed
and developing world. However, theory and evidence suggest that face-to-face interactions continue to be important
(see, e.g., Gaspar and Glaeser [1998] for a discussion).
In addition to examining the selection of emigrants and
the productivity differential attributed to emigrating, I also
exploit the increase in international collaboration among
scientists who did not emigrate after the end of the USSR.
This allows me to ask how important these phenomena are
for the productivity of scientists: international collaboration, which increases access to knowledge and resources
through nongeographic proximity, and emigration, which
increases geographic proximity. In the spirit of recent
research on the potential substitutes for geographic proximity (Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale 2008), I ask whether
we can view international collaboration as a substitute for
emigration and whether from a policy perspective, it is one
way to prevent “brain drain” from developing countries. My
results show that both emigrants and those who internationally collaborated are positively selected in terms of publications, but emigrants were the “best of the best.” Then, with a
difference-in-differences estimation approach using individual fixed effects, I show that while both emigration and
international collaboration are associated with an increase
in researcher productivity, by emigrating, scientists gain an
additional 0.23 publications per year on average compared to
those who stay but internationally collaborate. This difference can be considered a measure of the impact of location
on scientific productivity minus the benefits of gaining
access to knowledge and resources through nongeographic
proximity.

8

Chapter 3
Immigrant Selection Before
and After Communism
The fall of the Soviet Union brought about many changes
in the formerly communist countries. Almost suddenly, the
regime changes led to greater mobility and choice in employment and residence decisions as emigration restrictions were
lifted, and levels of internal and international migration
dramatically increased. Another dramatic change that characterized the transition to market economies was an increase in
wage inequality, which resulted from changes in the structure
of wages as the labor markets moved away from communist
wage grid systems, and from changes in the composition of
the labor force (see, e.g., Brainerd [2000]; Hunt [2002]). In
this essay, I study how these changes altered incentives to
emigrate and the subsequent impact on immigrant selection.
As the European Union (EU) enlarged in recent years,
there was considerable interest and concern about the consequences of immigration from its neighbors to the East—
the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, South Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
For the EU host countries, the concern was mainly about
what kinds of workers would immigrate and what increased
immigration would mean for native labor markets. Meanwhile, the concern in the source countries was about what
kinds of workers would emigrate and what impact an exodus
of workers westward would have on home labor markets and
national demographics.
Much of the literature on these issues to date deals with
the former aspect of immigration in the EU, that is, the
impact on natives (e.g., Angrist and Kugler [2003], who
look at the impact of European labor market institutions on
the relationship between immigration on native employment; and Friedberg [2001], who looks at the impact of
Soviet immigration on native outcomes in Israel). Yet, there
is still little empirical evidence on immigrant selection and
the impacts of emigration from Central and Eastern Europe,
South Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union on
source country labor markets. Recent research in the U.S.Mexico immigration literature is grounded in the Borjas
(1987) negative selection hypothesis based on the Roy
Model framework, which suggests that it is the low-skilled
workers from more unequal countries with higher returns to
human capital who choose to emigrate to the United States.
Since much of the concern in EU countries is that precisely
the low-wage workers will flood the EU gates, where wages
are higher and less dispersed, my motivation for this essay
was to test the immigrant selection hypotheses for immigrants from a selection of postcommunist countries and
to see how emigration decisions changed after the end of
communism.4
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The fall of the Soviet Union provides a unique opportunity to test the selection hypotheses among relatively highly
educated source country populations, as it dramatically,
almost suddenly, changed the wage structure and dispersion
of earnings in the formerly communist countries. Following
the approaches in the recent immigrant selection literature
(Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Moraga 2011), in this essay I
test the immigrant selection hypotheses using microlevel
data from three host countries (United States, Spain, and
Greece) and three postcommunist source countries (Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria). I also use retrospective data
from Ukraine from 1986 and the United States in 1990 to
see whether the nature of selection has changed since the
communist period. The choice of host countries and time
periods is based on differing levels of wage dispersion—the
United States has greater wage inequality than Europe, and
the USSR had less wage inequality than the postcommunist
countries today. This should differentially impact immigrant
selection and immigration decisions during these periods and
to these countries.
To test the hypotheses, I first estimate Mincerian-style
wage regressions and compare the returns to observable
characteristics among residents in source countries and
immigrants in host countries. Based on these results, I
make predictions concerning the nature of selection. I then
compare immigrants’ predicted wages in the source country
with the wages of their native counterparts for both the communist and postcommunist periods. Next, I use the DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reweighting method to create
counterfactual densities of the wages that immigrants would
obtain if they were paid according to the prices of skills in
the source countries. The difference between the actual and
counterfactual densities is immigrant selection in terms of
potential earnings. Despite limitations of small immigrant
sample sizes, the results suggests that there is positive selection for immigrants from all three countries in the United
States, while there is intermediate to negative selection for
Spain and Greece. However, since these results are likely to
be biased upward due to undercounting of immigrants and
the sorting of immigrants on unobserved ability, it is likely
that there is even greater negative selection for Spain and
Greece. For the communist period, I find that among Sovietborn men in the United States, there was intermediate selection, while among women, there was positive selection.
Notes
1. However, I cannot compare the relative importance of the two
grants, because as described in the empirical section of the
essay, the estimates are local treatment effects based on different
samples of scientists who are on the margin of receiving each
grant.
2. Web of Science ® prepared by THOMSON REUTERS ®, Inc.
(Thomson ®), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA: © Copyright
THOMSON REUTERS ® 2010. All rights reserved.
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3. There is evidence, however, that countries can gain from return
migration or from greater access to knowledge from abroad
(Agrawal et al. 2011).
4. For example, the United Kingdom initially announced it would
prevent all but “a few highly skilled or agricultural workers from
taking jobs in Britain” from the new accession countries; Spain
imposed a two-year restriction on Romanians and Bulgarians
looking to work in the country when the two countries acceded
in January 2007 (“Join the queue, says Spain” 2006).
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